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MICHAEL BLEANEY*
Some empirical research has suggested that inflation is more persistent under
floating exchange rates. Theoretically, we should expect a higher variance of
inflation persistence across countries under floating rates, but not necessarily a
higher mean. It is shown that estimates of inflation persistence are biased upwards
by underfitting mean shifts in the sample. After correction for mean shifts, there is
evidence of greater inflation persistence in the post–Bretton Woods period, but no
evidence of variation across exchange rate regimes. Monetary growth has been
much less accommodative of inflation since 1979, with no difference between EMS
and non-EMS countries. [JEL E31, E50, F31, F41]
D
oes the exchange rate regime affect how the monetary authorities react to
inflation shocks and, consequently, the persistence of those shocks?
Intuitively, one would answer in the affirmative, in view of the powerful
constraints on domestic policy actions imposed by a commitment to a fixed
exchange rate. Several empirical studies have suggested that inflation has been
significantly more persistent (positively serially correlated) and monetary
policy more accommodative of inflation under floating exchange rates than
under pegged rates (see Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991; Alogoskoufis, 1992;
Obstfeld, 1995). These results have been questioned recently by Burdekin and
Siklos (1999), who argue that, though there have been historical shifts in infla-
tion persistence, they have not been closely associated with exchange rate
regime changes. The general issue was first raised by Dornbusch (1982) in the
context of a country operating a linear policy rule for exchange rate adjustment
387
IMF Staff Papers
Vol. 47, No. 3













































































*Michael Bleaney is a Professor of Economics at the University of Nottingham. This paper was
written while he was a visiting scholar in the IMF Research Department.Michael Bleaney
388
in a pegged-rate regime. Dornbusch showed, the more that the exchange rate
accommodated inflation shocks, the more persistent these shocks were. 
None of these papers fully explores the theoretical dimensions of the problem.
Dornbusch (1982) treats the policy rule as exogenous, and does not consider
floating exchange rate regimes. Adams and Gros (1986) and Montiel and Ostry
(1991) examine the implications of targeting the real exchange rate. Alogoskoufis
and Smith (1991), Alogoskoufis (1992), Obstfeld (1995), and Burdekin and
Siklos (1999) provide a purely empirical analysis of the impact of exchange rate
regimes.
The first aim of this paper is therefore theoretical. I analyze the dynamics of
inflation as chosen by a government maximizing a social welfare function, which
includes a term in the deviation of domestic from foreign inflation. The weight
attached to this element of the loss function varies with the exchange rate regime,
as a way of capturing the loss of monetary independence associated with pegging
the exchange rate. 
On the empirical level, the evidence for OECD countries is apparently
rather striking. Simple regressions suggest that, under floating rates, inflation is
more persistent and monetary policy is much more likely to accommodate an
inflation shock. Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) estimate first-order autoregres-
sive coefficients for the annual change in the GDPdeflator for the United States,
and their point estimate is 0.27 for the period 1948–67 and 0.70 for the period
1968–87. Their results for the United Kingdom are very similar. Alogoskoufis
(1992) extended this work on inflation persistence to 21 OECD countries. For
the OECD weighted average, his results are very similar to those of
Alogoskoufis and Smith. For the individual countries, he finds that persistence
increased in 20 out of 21 cases, comparing 1972–87 with 1953–71. Obstfeld
(1995) revisited the issue, using data for 12 OECD countries over the period
1953–94. Dividing the data into 1953–72 for fixed rates and 1973–94 for
floating rates, he finds that persistence increased in the later period (although
not always by much) for all countries except the United States, which had
particularly high persistence in the fixed-rate period. Obstfeld attributes his
findings to the reserve-currency role played by the United States under the
Bretton Woods system. Finally, Burdekin and Siklos (1999) analyze long runs
of annual data for Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States,
using a procedure for identifying and dating multiple structural breaks in a
persistence regression. Their results suggest a statistically significant (but rela-
tively small) upward shift in persistence some time between 1974 and 1981 in
each country, although they question whether there is any historical association
between shifts in persistence and exchange rate regime changes.1
In the empirical section of this paper, it is first shown that estimates of infla-
tion persistence are highly sensitive to shifts in mean inflation during exchange
rate regimes. The crucial point is that, if n mean shifts occur during an exchange
rate regime, then allowing for n – 1 or fewer mean shifts biases upwards the
1The estimated shifts in persistence and dates are: Canada +0.03 (1981), Sweden +0.07 (1979), UK
+0.11 (1974) and US +0.06 (1979).estimate of persistence, whereas allowing for n + 1 or more shifts induces a down-
ward bias of much smaller proportions.2 This effect explains why dating the
exchange rate regime change at 1968 (as in Alogoskoufis and Smith, 1991) yields
much bigger differences in persistence than dating it later (as in Obstfeld, 1995):
mean inflation shifted upwards in the later 1960s, and underwent several further
shifts in later years, but was rather stable from 1950 to 1967. I reanalyze the
postwar evidence on exchange rate regimes and inflation persistence for a number
of OECD countries, allowing for this mean shift effect.
What about monetary policy under fixed and floating exchange rates? Using
data back to 1872, Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) report that weighted average
monetary growth in the United States and the United Kingdom accommodated
about half of inflation under floating rates, but did not accommodate it at all
under fixed rates. Interpreted in terms of a monetary policy reaction function,
this suggests that monetary policy was tightened much more in response to an
inflationary shock under fixed than under floating rates. As far as the postwar
period is concerned, this is a surprising finding, in view of the evidence from
recent research that, since 1979, the Federal Reserve’s real interest rate response
to U.S. inflation shocks has been much stronger than before, presumably in
recognition of expectational shifts in the Phillips curve (Clarida and others,
1998a; Taylor, 1999). My investigation of the dynamics of monetary growth
supports the conclusion that there has been a much stronger monetary policy
response to inflation shocks in recent decades. I find that monetary growth in the
United States was strongly accommodative of immediate past inflation in the
Bretton Woods period, but has been much less so under floating rates.
Comparing floating-rate countries with members of the European Monetary
System (EMS) for the 1980s and 1990s, I find no evidence of greater monetary
accommodation under floating exchange rates.
I. Theory
Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), Alogoskoufis (1992), and Obstfeld (1995) all
work with variants of the same model, which assumes overlapping contracts, with
each contract having a fixed probability of being renegotiated, along the lines of
Taylor (1980).3 If each contract has a probability 1–ψ of renegotiation in each
period, then
(1) 01 ≤≤ ψ pp x tt t =+ − ( ) − ψψ 1 1
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2As is discussed below, it matters whether or not we are concerned about bias relative to the true value
of the parameter or merely relative to the estimate from another sample. It is the latter which is important
in the present context, where comparisons of estimates are being made across exchange rate regimes. The
point made here is not the same point as that made by Burdekin and Siklos, who test for simultaneous
shifts in mean inflation and the persistence coefficient, so their analysis does not allow for mean shifts
within any given period when persistence is assumed to be constant.
3Dornbusch (1982) uses a slightly different version of the model in which each contract lasts for
precisely two periods.where x represents the level of newly contracted prices and p is the price level (all
in logs). Taking first differences of equation (1) shows that, unless new-contract
inflation (∆ x) is (sufficiently) negatively autocorrelated, aggregate inflation will
be positively autocorrelated, since
(2)
Negative autocorrelation of ∆ x could, of course, easily arise if monetary
policy refused to accommodate new-contract inflation. The next step is that the
money supply (m) in each country (in logs) is assumed to be related to the current
price level through a simple monetary policy reaction function:
(3)
In this equation, α is interpreted as a trend which reflects output growth and is
independent of current inflation, and β represents the degree to which the author-
ities are willing to accommodate the current level of prices. In this model, the
degree of persistence of inflation (and obviously, therefore, of monetary growth)
increases with the accommodation parameter, β (see the appendix to Obstfeld,
1995 for details). Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991), Alogoskoufis (1992), and
Obstfeld (1995) all speculate that β is likely to be higher under floating rates than
under fixed rates.4 In the empirical implementation, because of lack of data on x,
the procedure adopted by these authors is to estimate a first-order autoregression
for inflation, allowing the coefficients to change across exchange rate regimes,
and to estimate equation (3), again allowing for coefficients to change across
regimes.
In order to address the theoretical issue of inflation persistence under different
exchange rate regimes, I employ a model developed from the stochastic version of
the Barro-Gordon (1983) macroeconomic policy game introduced by Rogoff
(1985). In the closed-economy version of the model, the government maximizes a
utility function defined over inflation (π ) and output (y), where Y represents equi-
librium output:
Z = –0.5π 2 – 0.5b(y – Y – k)2 b,k > 0 (4)
In this equation, b represents the relative weight attached to the output objective,
while k is a device for introducing inflationary bias into the model. To this we add
an expectations-augmented Phillips curve that is subject to stochastic shocks:
y = Y + a(π – π e) + ε a > 0 (5)
where ε is a supply-side shock which is assumed to follow the process:
∆∆ mp =+ αβ
∆∆ ∆ ∆ px x x tt t t =− ( ) +− ( ) +− ( ) + −− 11 1 1
2
2 ψψ ψ ψ ψ ...   
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4The use of the word “speculate” is deliberate.  These authors do not derive this prediction from their
theoretical model; indeed Dornbusch makes this very point in his comments on Obstfeld’s paper (Obstfeld,
1995, p. 200).ε t = cε t–1 + η t η ~ N(0,(1 – c2)σ 2I) (6)
The parameter c (assumed > 0) determines the degree of autocorrelation in supply-
side shocks. The variance of η varies with c so as to standardize the variance of ε
at σ 2. In the context of the model described by equations (4) and (5), equation (6)
is a simpler way of introducing inflation persistence than through the overlapping
contracts model of equation (1).
The government chooses the inflation rate in order to maximize equation (4),
after observing the current-period shock. The private sector, however, is assumed
to form its expectations before observing the current-period shock. Substituting
for y from equation (5), differentiating equation (4) and setting the differential
equal to zero yields the following:
(1 + a2b)π = a2bπ e + ab(k – ε ) (7)
Assuming rational expectations, the private sector’s inflationary expectations are
determined by taking the mathematical expectation of equation (7). Using the fact
that, from equation (6), E(ε t)=cε t–1, this yields
π e
t = ab(k – cε t–1) (8)
In other words, inflationary expectations embody information about the expected
shock in time t conveyed by the observed shock in time t – 1. Substituting from
equation (8) back into equation (7) yields
π t = ab(k – cε t–1) – [(ab)/(1 + a2b)]η t. (9)
Within the context of this model, we may define monetary accommodation as
the degree to which a supply-side shock is absorbed in price rather than in output
fluctuations. From equation (9), it is evident that the anticipated component of the
shock (cε t-1) is more strongly accommodated than the unanticipated component
(η t). Since c determines the proportion of the shock which is anticipated, it follows
that more persistent shocks are more strongly accommodated. Equation (9) shows
that the unconditional mean of inflation is abk and, since we may write, using the
fact that from equation (6) cε t–2 = ε t–1 – η t–1,
(10)
it follows that the covariance of π t and π t–1 is given by
(11)
The variance of π t is:
(12) var πσ t ab c a b c ( ) = ( ) ++ ( ) − ( ) []
− 2 22 2 2 2 11
cov ππ σ tt ca b , − ( ) = ( ) 1
2 2
πε η η tt t t ab k ab ab a b −− − − =− ( ) +− ( ) + ( ) [] 11 1
2
1 1
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tence) is:
(13)
This is zero when c = 0, and increases with c to reach a maximum at
c2 =1 /[(1 + a2b)2 – 1], which could be greater or less than one. Inflation persis-
tence either increases monotonically with c, or increases with c up to this
maximum, and then declines.
So far, this is a model of a closed economy. The only difference from Rogoff
(1985) lies in the assumption of persistence in the supply-side shock. To derive an
open-economy version capable of allowing for different exchange rate regimes, I
introduce an additional term in the government’s utility function that reflects the
costs of deviating from the inflation rate of the foreign country which issues the
reserve currency of the fixed-rate system. These costs will reflect the exchange
rate regime in operation. Thus equation (4) becomes
h ≥ 0 (14)
where π * is the inflation rate of the reserve currency. The idea is that, under a
system of pegged exchange rates, h will be large and the last term will dominate
the other terms in equation (14), inducing the government to choose an inflation
rate close to π *. The costs of deviating from π * will be reflected in a balance of
payments disequilibrium and the policy adjustments required to correct it.
Because of nontraded goods, transport costs, etc., it is realistic to permit some
deviation of π from π * (i.e., f is not infinite). Under floating rates, there is no cost
to deviating from π = π *, since the exchange rate is free to adjust, so that h = 0.
Pegged exchange rates are assumed to impose no constraints on the reserve
country, which consequently chooses its inflation rate as if it were a closed
economy. The parameters a, b, and k are assumed common to all countries, but the
crucial parameter c, which measures the persistence of shocks, differs across
countries. This is a convenient way of capturing the idea that differences in insti-
tutional arrangements (e.g., the length and timing of wage contracts, or the degree
of wage indexation) will affect the persistence of any inflationary shock.
Shocks are assumed to have the same variance in all countries. The reserve
country is unconstrained by the pegged-rate regime and chooses its inflation rate
using equation (9), with c = c* (* denotes a reserve country variable):
(15)
The government of a nonreserve country chooses its inflation rate by maximizing
equation (14), subject to equations (5), (6), and (15), after observing the realiza-
tions of the shock in each country. It chooses the inflation rate









πε η ∗∗ ∗
−
∗ =− ( ) − ( ) + ( ) [] tt t ab k c ab a b 1
2 1
Zb y Y k h =− − − − ( ) −− ( ) 05 05 05 2 2 2 .. . * ππ π
corr ππ tt cc a b c ,. −
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The implications of equation (16) are as follows. As h tends to zero, equation (16)
tends to equation (9), while as h tends to infinity, it tends to equation (15), and π
approaches π *. For intermediate values of h, we get a weighted average of these
two solutions.
Following the same procedure as before, we find that inflation persistence is
given by
(17)
This expression is effectively a weighted average of inflation persistence under
floating rates and inflation persistence in the reserve country, with the weight
attached to the latter increasing with the degree of exchange rate constraint (h). It
implies that a more constraining exchange rate regime tends to reduce the variance
of inflation persistence across countries, because all countries take on the inflation
persistence of the reserve currency in proportion to the degree of exchange rate
constraint. It does not suggest, as previous authors have speculated, that inflation
persistence is necessarily lower in more constraining regimes. The model would
only predict this if the exchange rate regime constrains the reserve currency to
have low inflation persistence, or if it happened to have low inflation persistence
by chance.
The model could be developed in various ways, for example, by allowing
more of the parameters to vary across countries. A more realistic version would
replace the inflation differential in equation (14) by a term reflecting the accumu-
lated disequilibrium in the real exchange rate. This would reduce to equation (14)
only in the special case where the real exchange rate was at its equilibrium value
in period t – 1. It seems unlikely, however, that these more complex versions of
the model would greatly modify the conclusions reached above. The next section
considers the empirical evidence from major OECD countries over the postwar
period. 
II. Empirical Findings
It may seem a simple matter to estimate inflation persistence across exchange rate
regimes, but there is one very significant complication: persistence estimates can
easily be biased upward by mean shifts in the inflation process. If we estimate a
regression of the form:
(18)
when the true relationship is:
p a bp e tt t =+ + − 1
corr ππ tt ch c




( ) =+ ( ) ÷
++ + ( ) + ( ) − ( ) +− ( ) [] {}
1
2
22 22 2 2 2 22 2 11 1 1
ga ba b h =+ ( ) ++ ( )
−− 11 2 1 2 1
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where the t subscript to α indicates that the intercept term varies over time, then b
tends to be an upwardly biased estimate of β . This effect is particularly strong if
inflation undergoes a significant step shift in mean. The estimated mean obtained
from equation (18) [which is equal to a/(1 – b)] is then too high for one part of the
data set and too low for the other part, so that deviations from the mean appear to
be far more persistent than they really are. This effect is sufficient to explain, for
example, why much higher estimates of persistence are obtained by estimating
equation (18) for OECD countries over the period 1968–99 than over the years
1954–67 (see Bleaney, 1999, for an elaboration of this point with some examples).
The procedure adopted here to deal with this problem is to estimate a modi-
fied version of equation (18) whenever there appears to have been a shift in α over
the data set. This modification consists of including a dummy variable (Dt) in the
regression that takes a value of zero for the first observation and a value of one for
the final observation, and shifts from zero to one at a date chosen to maximize the
R2. Thus, the equation estimated is:
pt = a + gDt + bpt–1 + et (20)
While it may be that the inclusion of D in the regression is erroneous, Monte
Carlo estimates show that the downward bias to b that results from the erroneous
inclusion of D tends to be much smaller than the corresponding upward bias if D
is erroneously omitted (relative to the value of b that results from the correct spec-
ification). In 1,000 replications for a data set of 30 observations and either a shift
in α by two standard deviations of ε or no shift at all, with a true value of β of
0.50, the mean values of b obtained were as follows: 0.407 when equation (18)
was estimated and was the correct specification (i.e., α was constant), 0.401 when
equation (20) was estimated and was the correct specification, 0.352 when equa-
tion (20) was estimated but equation (18) was the correct specification, and 0.837
when equation (18) was estimated but equation (20) was the correct specification.
There is a noticeable downward bias to b even with the correct specification; this
bias is, however, irrelevant when comparing b across samples (as here), provided
that the bias is approximately equal in each case (which means, in practice, that
the comparison involves samples of similar time spans). If the time spans are
similar, then the crucial point is that incorrectly omitting D raises b in this case by
0.436 relative to the correct specification, but erroneously including it reduces b
by only 0.055. It is thus much safer to risk the latter error than the former.5
The analysis is based on annual observations of consumer prices for OECD
countries, taken from International Financial Statistics.6 Table 1 gives estimates
pp tt t t =+ + − αβ ε 1
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5The work of Burdekin and Siklos (1999) does not address the issue of how shifts in α affect estimates
of β ; they focus on the endogenous choice of break-points for both these parameters.
6More frequent observations (monthly or quarterly) are available for most of the period, but it is not
clear that it would be advantageous to use them. With higher-frequency observations, measurement error
problems would be magnified, since the one-period changes would be smaller. Using annual data also
preserves consistency with previous research.of persistence for sixteen countries for the Bretton Woods period. The first column
shows the results of estimating equation (18) over the period 1954–67, and the
second column gives estimates from equation (20) over the period 1954–72 with
an endogenously chosen shift in the intercept.7 The estimates of persistence are
mostly rather low, with a mean of 0.237 in column (1) and 0.109 in column (2).
The difference in means is a consequence of the dummy-variable effect: with an
equation (18) specification persistence estimates for 1954–72 are typically greater
than 0.5 (Bleaney, 1999, Table 1). It is noticeable that the reserve country (United
States) has much higher than average persistence, as also does Canada, which
floated its exchange rate from 1950 to 1962.
These findings are not particularly consistent with the theory of the previous
section. The variance of persistence across countries appears to be large (although
we lack a control group of floating countries), and countries which were not
constrained by the exchange rate peg (United States, Canada) seem to have greater
persistence, as Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) suggest.
Table 2 shows the results of a similar exercise for 1984–99. The starting date
was chosen to avoid the period of oil shocks and to separate the sample into coun-
tries that floated and those that were either members of the exchange rate mecha-
nism (ERM) of the EMS or pegged their exchange rate. The United Kingdom is
counted as a floater, although it did participate in the ERM from 1990 to 1992, as
is Germany, on the grounds that many observers interpret the EMS as a peg to the
German deutsche mark. With eight floating countries and seven nonfloaters, the
mean estimate of persistence is almost identical across the two samples. The vari-
ance is also lower for the nonfloaters, as predicted by the theory developed above,
although not significantly so.8
The results for 1984–99 are therefore much more consistent with the theory
expounded earlier than those for the Bretton Woods period. It is worth noting,
however, that average persistence is significantly higher in the later period than in
1954–72 (t29 = 3.22, p < 0.01).9 Burdekin and Siklos (1999) also found that there
was a significant upward shift in persistence in the 1974–81 period in each of the
four countries which they investigated.
Monetary Accommodation and Persistence
It is a basic proposition of international economics that the monetary policy of an
individual country is constrained under a system of fixed exchange rates. Since
domestic prices need to be kept in line with foreign prices, purely domestic infla-
tion shocks cannot be accommodated by monetary growth in the way in which
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE
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7The first observation of the dependent variable is not used i.e. when the period is given as 1954–67,
the first observation of the dependent variable used is 1955, to allow for the lagged dependent variable.
Data earlier than 1954 were not used because of Korean war effects and other disturbances to the inflation
process in some countries.
8The test for equality of variances yields F(8, 7) = 3.01, compared with a 95% critical value of 4.90.
9The t-test for the difference of means assumes that both populations are normally distributed with
equal variances. The Mann-Whitney U-test for the difference of medians, which assumes only that the two
populations have similar distributions, yields a test statistic of 48, which is also significant at the 1% level.they can under floating rates. There is no presumption, however, that monetary
policy will necessarily be more accommodating under floating rates.
Nevertheless, Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) report evidence of significant
monetary accommodation under floating rates, but none under fixed rates, based
on an estimate of the world money supply (a weighted average of the United
States and the United Kingdom) over more than a century.10
This claim needs to be evaluated in light of recent empirical work on
central banks’ use of interest rate policy. Since the late 1970s policymakers
have recognized the potential for expectations to shift the Phillips curve, and,
consequently, that monetary policy should react strongly enough to inflation
shocks to stabilize expectations (see, for example, OECD, 1977). To achieve
this requires essentially that inflation (actual or forecast) have a coefficient of
more than one in the nominal interest rate reaction function of the authorities,
to ensure that ex ante real interest rates move in the right direction (Svensson,
1999; Taylor, 1999). Clarida and others (1998a) show that the U.S. interest rate
Michael Bleaney
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Table 1. Inflation persistence in the Bretton Woods period
1954–67 1954–72
(no breaks) (one break) Break at end
Country
United States 0.476 0.444 1965
Japan 0.390 –0.071 1959
Australia 0.158 0.162 1970
New Zealand –0.151 0.110 1966
Austria –0.084 –0.278 1961
Belgium 0.518 0.098 1963
Denmark 0.456 0.039 1961
Germany 0.316 0.300 1970
Ireland 0.229 0.253 1968
Italy 0.513 0.387 1961
Netherlands 0.273 –0.129 1963
Norway –0.122 –0.331 1969
Sweden 0.067 0.026 1969
Switzerland 0.306 0.298 1968
U.K. 0.212 0.334 1967
Mean (s.d.) of the above  0.237 0.109
(0.226) (0.236)
Canada 0.687 0.271 1965
Note: Figures given are point estimates of b1 from the OLS regression π t = b0 + b1D + b2π t–1
+ ut where π denotes consumer price inflation; D = 0 for 1954 to the break date shown and D = 1
for the remainder of the period. The break date is chosen to maximize the R–squared.
10They estimate equation (3) by instrumental variables, using lagged inflation as the instrument. The
classification of the Bretton Woods period as a fixed-rate period is questionable, however, since it is not
clear that US monetary policy was constrained in any significant way, given that the US dollar was the
reserve currency.reaction function of the Federal Reserve shifted significantly after 1979, and
they estimate the expected inflation coefficient as 0.8 before 1979 and 2.0
afterwards.11 Clarida and others (1998b) show that post-1979 interest rate reaction
functions for other major countries are fairly similar to that for the United States.
These studies treat the interest rate rather than the money supply as the policy
variable, with the stock of money adjusting passively to money demand at the
given interest rate. This is probably a realistic view of the policy process. Its
implication is that, provided that the demand for money function is reasonably
stable, monetary accommodation of inflation should be smaller when the interest
rate reaction function has a higher inflation coefficient. Thus the evidence from
estimated interest rate reaction functions suggests the opposite hypothesis to that
of Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) (hereafter referred to as AS) for the postwar
period: monetary accommodation should be found to be stronger in the 1950s and
1960s than in the 1980s and 1990s.
EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND INFLATION PERSISTENCE
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11These are the long-run coefficients. The short-run reaction is much less, as there is a high coefficient
on the last-period interest rate.
Table 2. Inflation persistence and exchange rate regimes 1984–99
1984–99
(one break) Break at end
Floating exchange rate




New Zealand 0.318 1987
United Kingdom 0.304 1991
Greece 0.515 1993
Germany 0.482 1995
Mean (s.d.) of the above 0.342
(0.191)








Mean (s.d.) of the above 0.354
(0.110)
Notes: Figures given are point estimates of b1 from the OLS regression π t = b0+ b1D + b2π t–1+ ut
where π denotes consumer price inflation; D = 0 for 1984 to the break date shown and D = 1 for the
remainder of the period. The break date is chosen to maximize the R–squared.In reality, these two hypotheses are not in direct contradiction and could be
combined into a joint hypothesis that the reaction function of the monetary authorities
varies over time and with the exchange rate regime. For a country which experi-
enced no change in exchange rate regime over time, the former effect should domi-
nate; the latter effect should be evident in a comparison of countries at a given date.
Since the U.S. dollar was the reserve currency in the Bretton Woods system, the
United States is a good approximation to a country with an unchanged exchange
rate regime over the postwar period. The estimated model for U.S. monetary
growth allows for structural breaks in 1973 (as suggested by AS) and in 1980 (as
suggested by Clarida and others). To test for exchange rate regime effects, I use a
panel of industrial countries over the period 1983–98. In the empirical implemen-
tation, I develop the model slightly by specifying monetary growth as a function of
both inflation and monetary growth in the previous year—in other words, I allow
for both accommodation of inflation and persistence in monetary growth simulta-
neously. The reason for this is that financial innovation has shifted the demand
function over time, and the gradual spread of financial innovations, as they occur,
creates some serial correlation in monetary growth. I find that entering lagged
rather than current inflation in the regression yields a better fit (without altering the
conclusions in any substantive way), and this permits the use of OLS.
The results for the United States are shown in Table 3. Regression (1) includes
shift and multiplicative dummies for a break at the end of the Bretton Woods
period and for a break in 1980. According to this regression, monetary persistence
is high (the coefficient of lagged monetary growth is around 0.5) but does not
appear to vary significantly over the period. Monetary accommodation is esti-
mated to be high initially but to fall substantially after 1980 (the coefficient of
lagged inflation is 0.9 for the Bretton Woods period, increases to 1.4 for 1973–79,
and falls to 0.3 after 1980). Regression (2) omits the insignificant variables from
regression (1), which greatly improves the t-statistics. The monetary accommoda-
tion coefficient is estimated at 1.05 up to 1979, and then falls to 0.33, with the shift
significant at the 5 percent level. These results are more consistent with the story
in Clarida and others than with an exchange rate effect.
Given that monetary policy reaction functions appear to have shifted signif-
icantly over time, it is important to test for exchange rate regime differences
over a period where these reaction functions have been relatively stable. Table 4
reports a similar regression to that reported in Table 3 for a panel of eighteen
industrial countries over the period 1984–98.12 In each year, countries are
defined as floating (exchange rate regime dummy = 1) or not floating (exchange
rate regime dummy = 0), which includes the membership of the EMS. The clas-
sification was based on Ghosh and others (1995), updated to 1998. The coeffi-
cients on lagged monetary growth and lagged inflation are allowed to vary
according to the exchange rate regime. The results indicate that short-run mone-
tary accommodation was actually lower under floating rates, although the signif-
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12The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
13The point estimates of long-run accommodation are 0.699 [ = 0.633/(1 – 0.094)] for non-floating
regimes and 0.601 [= (0.633 – 0.282)/(1 – 0.094 – 0.323)] for floating regimes. icantly higher coefficient on the lagged dependent variable means that estimated
long-run accommodation is similar.13
The results of this section confirm that there was a significant shift in the
monetary policy reaction function in the 1970s. On the other hand, there is no
evidence that monetary accommodation has been significantly greater in countries
with floating exchange rates than in members of the EMS in recent years. This is
slightly surprising, since Clarida and others (1998b) find that German interest
rates have a large coefficient in estimated interest rate reaction functions of other
EMS countries in the post-1979 period, while U.S. interest rates have only a small
(although statistically significant) coefficient in the reaction functions of the
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Table 3. Monetary accommodation in the United States 1956–99





Dummy 1973–99 –8.70 –3.88
(–1.28) (–2.32)
Dummy 1980–99 9.07 4.67
(1.34) (2.02)
∆ mt–1 0.531 0.539
(2.48) (4.64)
(Dummy 1973–99)*∆ mt–1 0.215
(0.48)
(Dummy 1980–99)*∆ mt–1 –0.200
(–0.47)
π t–1 0.912 1.05
(2.45) (4.09)
(Dummy 1973–99)* π t–1 0.475
(0.77)
(Dummy 1980–99)* π t–1 –1.06 –0.725
(–2.02) (–2.35)
No. of observations 44 44
R–squared 0.610 0.603
Standard error 2.44 2.36
Serial correlation (SC) 0.74 0.23
Functional form (FF) 0.26 0.88
Normality of residuals (N) 0.32 0.46
Heteroscedasticity (H) 1.04 0.93
Note: Figures in parentheses are t–statistics. Diagnostic statistics are defined as follows: SC –
Lagrange multiplier test for first–order serial correlation (χ 21); FF – test for functional form based
on correlation of residuals with the squared dependent variable (χ 21); N – Jarque–Bera statistic for
normality of residuals (χ 22); H – test for heteroscedasticity based on correlation between fitted
values and squared residuals (χ 21).Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan for the same period. It may be that the impact
of financial innovation on the money demand function is dominating the results,
and effectively blurring the exchange rate regime effects on the dynamics of the
money stock.
III. Conclusions
According to the theoretical analysis offered above, the constraints imposed by
pegging the exchange rate have the effect of making inflation in all countries
reflect the dynamics of inflation in the reserve currency. This only reduces infla-
tion persistence if persistence is particularly low in the reserve country, or if the
exchange rate regime constrains the reserve country to have low persistence. It is
not clear that either of these last two conditions held under the Bretton Woods
system. In the general case, theory predicts that persistence will have a greater
cross-country spread under floating than under pegged exchange rates.
Empirical tests of this hypothesis are seriously complicated by variations in
the mean inflation rate that have a substantial impact on estimated persistence.
There is evidence of significantly increased persistence compared with the 1950s
and 1960s in the typical OECD country, but not of higher persistence for floating-
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Table 4. Monetary accommodation and exchange rate regimes
Eighteen countries 1984–98













(Exchange rate regime dummy)* π t–1 –0.282
(–1.40)
No. of observations 271
R–squared 0.230
Standard error 0.0638
p–value of test for fixed effects F(17, 248) 0.26
Note: Figures in parentheses are t–statistics. Exchange rate regime dummy = 1 for floating
rates, = 0 for EMS or pegged rates.rate rather than for EMS countries in the 1980s and 1990s. This is consistent with
the Burdekin-Siklos argument that inflation persistence has changed over time for
reasons unconnected with the exchange rate regime. The cross-country variance of
persistence estimates was surprisingly high in the Bretton Woods period; in the
1980s and 1990s the variance was somewhat lower for EMS than for floating-rate
countries, but the sample is small. There is no evidence in recent OECD data that
monetary policy is more accommodative under floating rates.
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